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IN THE SHADOW OF THE LEGISLATURE: 
THE COMMON LAW IN THE AGE OF THE 
NEW PUBLIC LAW 
Daniel A. Farber* and Philip P. Frickey** 
It is a commonplace that we live in a statutory era. A century ago, 
statutes were considered intrusions into the pristine order of the com-
mon law.1 Today, legislatures are the primary source of law, and the 
statute books grow exponentially. Nevertheless, the common law has 
shown great vitality. In the past thirty years, for example, the law of 
products liability has undergone explosive growth.2 The common law 
has also retained its ability to respond to changes in social values. In 
contracts, old common law doctrines like "employment at will" are 
under increasing attack.3 In property, long-established rules are being 
challenged in the name of new social values. 4 
There is nothing new about change in the common law. But in an 
era of statutes, the role of the common law in formulating social policy 
has become problematic. Arguments for innovation in the common 
law are almost always challenged on the ground that the legislature, 
not the court, is the proper forum in which to argue for reform. Ex-
isting common law rules may be challenged for reposing too much 
policymaking discretion in the courts. 5 
In this essay, we explore how modem common law judges should 
view their role vis-a-vis the legislature. We suggest that the perspec-
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1. See, e.g., W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES & MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STAT· 
UTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 242 (1988); Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy. 45 u. 
PITT. L. REV. 1, 33-35 (1983). 
2. See, e.g .• PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 677-724 (5th ed. 1984). 
3. See, e.g .• E.A. FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS§ 7.17, at 320-25 (1990); St. 
Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. 
REV. 56 (1988). 
4. See, e.g., Babcock & Feurer, Land as a Commodity "Affected with a Public Interest'~ 52 
WASH. L. REv. 289, 295 n.33 (1977) (discussing judicial changes in landlord/tenant law); 
Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modem Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1529, 1540-
44 (1989). 
5. We develop these themes in Part II infra. 
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tive of the "New Public Law," as we conceptualize it, is surprisingly 
helpful in considering this problem. 
In Part I, we briefly summarize two important aspects of the New 
Public Law: republicanism and public choice. We then address an 
obvious objection to our project - that our topic relates to private 
law, and is therefore outside the purview of the New Public Law. Part 
II turns to important questions about the relationship between statutes 
and the common law: When should statutes be considered to displace 
existing common law remedies? In considering a possible reform in 
the common law, when should a court defer to possible legislative ac-
tion? In analyzing these questions, we examine two lines of cases, one 
dealing with tort actions in admiralty, the other with the federal com-
mon law of nuisance. These cases exemplify two possible judicial re-
sponses to the intrusion of statutes into common law adjudication. 
Some opinions take statutes as a signal to abandon the common law, 
but common law can be a valuable adjunct to legislative policymaking. 
Part III contains some final reflections on the extent to which the com-
mon law remains viable as a method of making social policy in an 
increasingly statutory age. 
Questions of this sort have particular importance today, and not 
just because the expansion of legislation has made them more com-
mon. Ultimately, the proper division of policymaking between courts 
and legislatures is at stake. Partly as a result of public law theory, the 
relationship between courts and legislatures has become increasingly 
problematic. 
At one time we had a clear idea of what legislatures did and how it 
differed from what courts did. Legislatures made ex ante rules to 
achieve public policies; courts administered ex post justice in disputes 
between private parties. Each body had the specialized abilities neces-
sary to perform its functions properly. 6 None of this is clear anymore. 
Since the time of the legal realists, the policymaking role of the courts 
has become undeniable, and that policymaking has taken an increas-
ingly conscious ex ante perspective. 7 Republicanism has helped illu-
minate the role of the courts in articulating public values. On the 
other hand, because of public choice, today we question the ability of 
the legislature to make good (or even coherent) public policy. So it is 
6. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 185-88 (tent. ed. 1958). 
7. For a recent discussion of the policymaking role of the courts, see M. EISENBERG, THE 
NATURE OF THE CoMMON LAW 1-3, 26-37 (1988). See generally Easterbrook, The Supreme 
Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(1984). 
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increasingly hard to find the appropriate boundary between judicial 
and legislative policymaking. 
Of course, a full understanding of the limits of judicial policymak-
ing would require not only a more comprehensive consideration of the 
common law, but also of the judicial role in statutory and constitu-
tional interpretation.8 With the help of the New Public Law, we seek 
here only to illuminate a part - though an important part - of the 
general problem of defining the appropriate boundaries of judicial poli-
cymaking in an increasingly statutory world. 
I. DEFINING THE NEW PUBLIC LAW 
There are undoubtedly different ways to characterize the public 
law scholarship of the past decade or so. One of its most distinctive 
attributes (and the one on which we will focus) is the much more care-
ful and explicit attention granted to political theory. Unlike the plu-
ralist theories of the 1950s, currently influential theories reject the 
view that the public interest will automatically emerge from the con-
flicting efforts of interest groups.9 In particular, two new movements 
in the study of political institutions, republicanism and public choice 
theory, have had a major impact on legal scholarship in public law. In 
this Part, we briefly sketch the major outlines of these two movements 
and discuss the relationship that we see between them. We also con-
sider whether the term "public law" helps in defining the scope of the 
New Public Law. 
A. What Is ''New" About the New Public Law? 
One strand of the New Public Law derives from a communitarian 
strain in modem political thought that has become known as republi-
canism. "Republicanism" was hardly a household word even for pub-
lic law scholars until the 1980s. The term is unfortunately misleading: 
the political philosophy called "republicanism" has no particular con-
nection with the Republican party. The general obscurity of the term 
is itself quite meaningful, for the neo-republicans claim to have redis-
covered a forgotten yet fundamental strand of American political 
thought. For the uninitiated, a brief, ruthlessly oversimplified intro-
8. For discussions by one prominent theorist of how republicanism and public choice might 
influence constitutional law, administrative law, and statutory interpretation, see C. SUNSTEIN, 
AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990), reviewed in Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil Rights, 
Environmental Law, and Statutory Interpretation, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming). Some of our 
thoughts about constitutional law in this regard are reflected in D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, LAW 
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRmCAL INTRODUCTION ch. 4 (1991). 
9. See infra text accompanying notes 16·22 (discussing republicanism), text accompanying 
notes 23-32 (discussing public choice theory). 
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duction will suffice for our purposes.10 
The dominant strand of American political philosophy has been 
liberalism - another misleading term, since philosophical liberalism is 
at least as much embraced by political conservatives as liberals. Philo-
sophical liberalism begins with the individual rather than the commu-
nity11 and posits that individuals have basic human rights that exist 
independent of any particular political system. Political conservatives 
may view these rights as involving property; political liberals may 
stress rights of individual self-expression or equality; but both agree 
that these rights are constraints on government rather than creations 
of government.12 
Liberalism also assumes that individuals have interests that they 
seek to advance, both in private life and in politics.13 The govern-
ment's role is defined in terms of these individual interests while re-
specting individual rights.14 One important function of goyernment, 
therefore, is to provide fair procedures for determining who prevails 
when individuals or groups conflict. 1s 
Philosophical liberalism is the dominant strain in current Ameri-
can thought. In the eighteenth century, however, another political 
tradition - republicanism - was also highly infiuential.16 During the 
Revolutionary era, many prominent Americans were strongly influ-
enced by the teachings of the seventeenth-century Opposition party in 
England. The Opposition thinkers had decried the destruction of the 
old order, the rise of corruption, and the loss of civic virtue. The fate 
of the nation, they believed, rested on the willingness of individuals to 
sacrifice private interests to the common good.17 
Modem reconstructions of republicanism are based on the allure of 
10. Readers who are not familiar with the republicanism literature would do well to start 
with the symposium on the subject in the July 1988 issue of the 'yale Law Joumal See Sympo-
sium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 91 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). The articles by Michelman 
and Sunstein exemplify the efforts to modernize republicanism, while the commentators offer a 
number of probing challenges to that effort. Another excellent critique of republicanism can be 
found in Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the 
Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567 (1988). 
11. See, e.g., Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: 
Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REv. 443, 445-52 (1989). 
12. Compare J. RAWIS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971) with R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, 
STATE, AND UTOPIA 88-90 (1974). 
13. J. RAWIS, supra note 12, at 4. 
14. Id. at 5-6. 
15. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 11, at 449. 
16. For a summary of the historical literature, see D. FARBER & s. SHERRY, A HISTORY OP 
THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION ch. 1 (1990). 
17. Legislative abuses between 1776 and 1789 disillusioned many prominent Americans 
about popular virtue as a sufficient basis for democracy, and they turned to alternate theories of 
government. The republican influence remained, however, particularly among the anti-Federal-
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civic virtue. 18 Political life is not, as liberalism posits, merely an effort 
to use the machinery of government to further the ends of private life. 
Rather, politics is a distinct and in ·some respects superior sphere in 
which citizens rise above their merely private concerns to join in a 
public dialogue to define the common good.19 Indeed, one of the most 
important tasks of government is to make the citizenry more virtuous 
by modifying existing individual preferences to further the common 
good.20 
According to republicans, courts can play an important role in this 
process. As forums for public deliberation, courts can identify and 
promote the acceptance of public values. 21 Courts can also ensure that 
the decisions of other agencies of the government reflect republican 
deliberation rather than an equilibrium of private interests. 22 
On the surface, at least, public choice theory23 stands in stark con-
trast to republican theory. Public choice usually claims to be positive 
while republicanism is explicitly normative, and the implications of 
public choice seem as dismal as those of republicanism seem optimis-
tic. Again, because of its recent prominence, we will present only a 
brief, simplified overview of public choice for the uninitiated. 24 
As we see it, public choice theory is a hybrid: it applies the econo-
mist's methods to the political scientist's subject. Public choice is 
largely concerned with abstract, axiomatic modeling of political 
processes. These models often view the legislative process as a 
microeconomic system in which "actual political choices are deter-
mined by the efforts of individuals and groups to further their own 
interests,''25 efforts that have been labeled "rent seeking."26 Thus, 
ists who opposed the new Constitution, but possibly also to some degree among Federalists such 
as James Madison. See id. at 15-19. 
18. The best statements of the modem republican position can be found in Sunstein, Interest 
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985), and Michelman, The Supreme 
Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1986). 
19. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 31. 
20. See, e.g., Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 
VA. L. REv. 543 (1986). 
21. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 52. 
22. See, e.g., id. at 63-64. 
23. Because this is such a new field, even its title is not yet settled, with some scholars prefer-
ring terms such as "rational choice" or "the new institutionalism." The standard term in the 
legal literature, however, is public choice. See D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, supra note 8, 
Introduction. 
24. For a more detailed treatment, see D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, supra note 8. 
25. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. 
EcON. 371, 371 (1983). 
26. "Rent-seeking refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (le., payments for the use of 
an economic asset in excess of the market price) through government intervention in the mar-
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"[t]he basic assumption ... is that taxes, subsidies, regulations, and 
other political instruments are used to raise the welfare of more influ-
ential pressure groups."27 
Further, collective action problems make it difficult to organize 
large groups of individuals to seek broadly dispersed public goods.28 
Public choice suggests that political activity will instead be dominated 
by small groups of individuals seeking to benefit themselves.29 The 
most easily organized groups presumably consist of a few individuals 
or firms seeking government benefits for themselves, benefits which 
will be financed by the general public. Accordingly, under this view 
"rent-seeking" special interest groups dominate politics. 
This vision of politics is disturbing precisely because it suggests 
that there is an underlying, coherent pattern to political outcomes, but 
one that most people find normatively unattractive. The implications 
of another branch of public choice theory are, if anything, even more 
dismal. Some public choice theorists have suggested that, far from 
systematic rent-seeking, political processes necessarily lead to entirely 
arbitrary or incoherent outcomes. 30 
ket." Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An In-
terest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224 n.6 (1986). 
27. Becker, supra note 25, at 373-74. For example, the economic theory of legislation re-
counted by William Landes and Richard Posner is firmly grounded in that tradition: 
In the economists' version of the interest-group theory of government, legislation is supplied 
to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of favorable legislation. The price that the 
winning group bids is determined both by the value of legislative protection to the group's 
members and the group's ability to overcome the free-rider problems that plague coalitions. 
Payment takes the form of campaign contributions, votes, implicit promises of future favors, 
and sometimes outright bribes. In short, legislation is "sold" by the legislature and 
"bought" by the beneficiaries of the legislation. 
Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 
875, 877 (1975) (footnote omitted). 
28. The economic analysis of interest group politics can be traced to Mancur Olson's theory 
of collective action. See M. OLSON, THE Lome OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). Political action often confers benefits on large groups. For 
example, everyone presumably benefits from improved national security. An individual's actions 
in support of national security, however, normally can have only an infinitesimally small effect. 
Hence, a rational individual will try to "free ride" on the efforts of others, contributing nothing 
to the national defense while benefiting from other people's actions. W. EsKRIDGE & P. 
FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 48-49. 
29. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 26, at 231-32. As Becker points out, most groups involved in 
politics suffer from free rider problems. What is important is the relative rather than absolute 
degree of free riding, since this determines the relative power of the group. See Becker, supra 
note 25, at 380. 
30. Concern about the possible incoherence and meaninglessness of legislative outcomes 
stems from Arrow's Theorem, which demonstrates the impossibility of designing a completely 
rational method of making group decisions. D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, supra note 8, ch. 2 
(discussing Arrow's Theorem). A simple example illustrates the heart of the difficulty. Suppose 
that three legislators must vote on where to locate a new federal facility, and that their prefer-
ences are as follows: 
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Jerry Mashaw has aptly summarized the potentially dismal impli-
cations of the research inspired by Arrow's Theorem: 
The most basic finding of the Arrovian branch of public choice theory 
might be characterized as indicating that collective action must be either 
objectionable or uninterpretable. A stable relationship between the pref-
erences of individuals and the outcomes of collective choice processes 
can be obtained only by restrictions on decision processes that most peo-
ple would find objectionable. At its most extreme, Arrovian public 
choice predicts that literally anything can happen when votes are taken. 
At its most cynical, it reveals that, through agenda manipulation and 
strategic voting, majoritarian processes can be transformed into the 
equivalent of a dictatorship. In a more agnostic mode, it merely suggests 
that the outcomes of collective decisions are probably meaningless be-
Legislator 1 prefers Texas to Illinois, and Illinois to Florida. 
Legislator 2 prefers Illinois to Florida, and Florida to Texas. 
Legislator 3 prefers Florida to Texas, and Texas to Illinois. 
Now suppose that the legislators will first decide between Texas and Illinois, with the winner to 
be paired against Florida. Texas will win the first round, receiving support from legislators 1 and 
3, but Florida will end up with the facility because legislators 2 and 3 prefer it to Texas on the 
second round of voting. Unfortunately, it is apparent that Florida does not represent the "major-
ity will," because two of the three legislators prefer Illinois to Florida. In fact, unless procedural 
rules restrict how many motions can be made, the voting could continue forever. On a majority 
vote, Illinois loses to Texas, Texas loses to Florida - but Florida loses to Illinois, so we are right 
back where we started. The legislators are trapped in a revolving door with no exit. 
Arrow was interested in the problem of measuring social welfare. Given the varying prefer-
ences of individuals, when does a change make society as a whole better oft? Rather than identi-
fying a method of answering this question, he ultimately proved that an answer is impossible. 
More precisely, he showed that no method of combining preferences can satisfy such basic re-
quirements as the following: 
(a) Minimum rationality. If society prefers outcome A to outcome B and outcome B to 
outcome C. then society prefers A over C 
(b) The Pareto standard. If one individual prefers A over Band no one else cares, then 
society prefers A over B. 
(c) Nondictatorship. Society's preferences do not simply reflect the desires of one given 
individual. 
(d) Universal applicability. The method has to work for any possible combination of 
individual preferences, not just for particular situations. 
(e) Irrelevant alternatives. If C is not on the agenda, the choice between A and B 
should not depend on how they are ranked relative to C 
These are obviously quite modest aspirations, either for a method of measuring social welfare or 
for a system of social decisionmaking. And yet, as Arrow demonstrated, even these modest 
aspirations cannot be satisfied. 
One might hope that, while cycling is a theoretical possibility, it would not occur very often. 
Later work, however, suggests that under plausible circumstances there will be a complete cycle. 
That is, given any two outcomes A and Z. where a majority prefers A to Z. there will be a series 
of outcomes B, C. . . . Y, such that A is beaten by B, B beaten by C. and so forth down to Y. 
which in tum is beaten by Z A would beat Z in a direct vote, but a series of motions could 
successfully be made replacing A with other alternatives, which would ultimately result in adop-
tion of Z This possibility gives enormous power to the agenda setter. The person in charge of 
the agenda could guarantee the adoption of A by pitting A and Z against each other in a direct 
vote. On the other hand, the agenda setter could obtain the passage of Z by scheduling interme-
diate votes involving B through Y. The result would then be that A would lose to B, B to C. and 
so on, until finally Y is replaced by Z What looks like majority rule is actually within the 
complete control of the person who controls the agenda, who can exploit the possibility of a cycle 
to dictate the outcome. D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, supra note 8, ch. 2; see P. ORDESHOOK, 
GAME THEORY AND PoLmcAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 71-82 (1986). 
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cause it is impossible to be certain that they are not simply an artifact of 
the decision process that has been used. 31 
As Mashaw implies, much of the public choice literature makes for 
fairly grim reading, offering the choice between viewing legislatures as 
corrupt or mindless. This grimness seems to be diminishing in recent 
public choice scholarship. Recent studies have shown that legislators 
are not merely pawns of special interest groups and that a variety of 
stabilizing devices may allow legislatures to escape incoherence.32 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that public choice still tends to emphasize 
the frailties of democratic government. 33 
As we have characterized the New Public Law, its main feature is 
the self-conscious use of political theory. Yet the two branches of 
political theory that have been most influential are clearly in tension. 
Under public choice theory government functions as a mechanism for 
combining private preferences into a social decision. The preferences 
themselves remain untouched. In contrast, in republican thought pri-
vate preferences are secondary; preferences are if anything the prod-
ucts of government action rather than its inputs.34 Rather than 
mechanically processing preferences, government involves an intellec-
tual search for the morally correct answer.35 
31. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 CHI.· KENT 
L. REv. 123, 126-27 (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
32. See D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, supra note 8, chs. 1-2. 
33. In an ambitious article, Richard Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson argue that Arrow's The-
orem does not pose any threat to democratic legitimacy. Pildes & Anderson, Slinging A"ows at 
Democracy: Social-Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
2121 (1991). Although space does not permit a full discussion of their thesis, we have some brief 
co=ents. Much of the article (Part II, "Reconceiving Rationality"), purports to be an attack 
on social choice theory, but is in reality an attack on the theory of rational choice adopted by 
most economists. Since public choice is an application of economic thought to political 
problems, it is not unexpected that it suffers from whatever flaws may generally be found in the 
discipline of economics. (The authors come close to making this explicit later in the article, at p. 
2177 n.139, but Part II makes the point fairly clear by applying many of its arguments to individ-
ual as well as to collective choice.) We leave it to the economists to defend the viability of their 
discipline. In our view, the Pildes and Anderson argument on this point has some force in those 
situations where basic values are sharply in conflict, but they may well overestimate the extent to 
which this is true of ordinary governmental decisions. 
Only in Part III of the article do the authors tum specifically to the problem of voting para-
doxes. There, they echo the argument made earlier by one of us that democratic procedures 
cannot be assessed purely on the basis of voting outcomes, but must be assessed in large part 
based on the basis of other vital norms and institutions. See Farber, Democracy and Disgust: 
Reflections on Public Choice, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 161, 171-76 (1989). See also infra note 36. 
They also argue that "path dependence" should not be considered a serious problem (pp. 2196-
97), an argument that we regard as important and persuasive. As we understand it, their concep-
tion of democracy does not stress majority rule but rather equal participation. Because voting is 
peripheral to their concept of democracy, it is unsurprising that they find flaws in majority voting 
procedures to be of little concern. But we suspect that many of our readers think that majority 
rule is an important feature of democracy, and that its potential flaws are troublesome. 
34. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
35. As Frank Michelman has written of the republican elements in Rousseau's thought: 
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It would be hard to imagine a vision of representative government 
that differs more than republicanism from the rent-seeking models we 
discussed earlier or from the chaos and cycling of Arrow's Theorem. 36 
This contrast forms the basis for much of the appeal of republicanism. 
Where public choice theorists are prone to see haphazard cycling or 
rent-seeking by special interest groups, republicans find the possibility 
of genuine political dialogue in search of the public good. 37 
This is not the place for a full rendition of our views on republican-
ism and public choice, but a few brief reflections are relevant to our 
later discussion. We find some of the lessons of republicanism attrac-
tive: ideas as well as pocketbooks matter in politics, civic-mindedness 
is more than a myth, and government can be a moral teacher as well as 
a reflection of public opinion. While it is possible to overemphasize 
these elements of political life, we think it equally wrong to dismiss 
them. Nevertheless, where public choice theory risks cynicism, repub-
licanism can verge on a dangerous romanticism about politics. 
Although contemporary republicans concede that the political process 
is subject to rent-seeking, they may overestimate the extent to which 
public deliberation elevates political outcomes over prior 
It follows from the Rousseauean view that majoritarian politics cannot be only the individu-
alistically self-serving activity "realistically" portrayed by economics-minded political scien-
tists and theorists. Politics must also be a joint and mutual search for good or right answers 
to the question of directions for our evolving selves. In other words, to hold to Rousseau's 
view we must be able to imagine ourselves voting for the Endangered Species Act • . . 
although we would not as individuals be willing (or bet that our constituents would be 
willing) to pay any measurable sums of money for the enactment of that principle; and 
although no one has offered us anything in exchange for our vote, explicitly or implicitly; 
and although we know well that we may some day find our own private projects inconve-
nienced or thwarted by the statute and the principle to which we are now committing 
ourselves. 
Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong With Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGH-
TON L. REV. 487, 509-10 (1979) (footnote omitted). 
36. In Law and Public Choice we discuss a possible Madisonian reconciliation between these 
visions. D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, supra note 8, at ch. 2. Briefly, we suggest that public choice 
supports republicanism in its rejection of th.e pluralist view that the political process is a purely 
passive reflection of preexisting preferences. As Arrow's Theorem demonstrates, preexisting 
preferences cannot be coherently combined to generate social choices. Rather, preferences have 
to be processed through the legislative machinery, applying norms such as fairness and using 
committees and other stability-enhancing devices. Legislative choice is also expedited if there is 
sufficient cultural consensus to generate unipeaked preferences along single dimensions of dis-
pute. By undermining pluralism, social choice provides support for at least a weak form of 
republicanism in which government is seen as not merely passive but instead as actively process-
ing existing preferences. 
37. In particular, republicans can escape from the dismal implications of Arrow's Theorem 
by rejecting the entire perspective on politics behind the theorem. Arrow's Theorem sees politics 
as a machine, with preferences as the input and decisions as the output. For republicans, how-
ever, preferences are shaped by politics, while dialogue and reason are the energizing forces be-
hind political decisions. From a republican perspective, the only surprise about Arrow's 
Theorem is that it is possible to prove mathematically what republicans regard as an obvious 
truth: that government cannot simply be the handmaiden of private preferences. 
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preferences. 38 
Given that public choice emphasizes the possible pathologies of 
democratic government while republicanism considers government's 
possible accomplishments, it is little wonder that the two have ap-
pealed to different groups of scholars. Conservatives who are suspi-
cious of government have found in public choice a congenial catalogue 
of political misdemeanors, while progressive communitarians have 
been drawn to republicanism. For this reason, the New Public Law 
has developed along somewhat different left- and right-wing lines. 
Nevertheless, the two may be used in tandem, with republicanism 
serving to illuminate the normative possibilities of democratic govern-
ment and public choice highlighting its potential pitfalls. 39 
One of our purposes here is to suggest that these two very different 
theories can effectively be combined in legal analysis, although doing 
so does risk some cognitive dissonance. It would be nice, of course, if 
the political scientists would present us with some grand synthesis 
combining public choice and republicanism. But the New Public Law 
can offer considerable insight even without such a synthesis.40 
B. What Is 'Public" About the New Public Law? 
We suggest that the New Public Law can illuminate some interest-
ing common law problems.41 For many people, however, "common 
38. Where political positions are reinforced by self-interest, discussion will not likely cause 
major changes. Regardless of argument, individuals are likely to cling to their own political 
views, not because those views are merely camouflaged self-interest but because it is so tempting 
to embrace beliefs that are also in one's self-interest. Moreover, in important political disputes, 
neither side is likely to have a knock-down argument. Often, the facts will be in dispute or 
clashing values will resist philosophical resolution. This is not to say that political debate is 
fruitless, but only that we should not view it as a panacea. 
39. For an early example of this use of the theories in tandem, see Eskridge, Dynamic Statu-
tory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987). 
40. The use of such diverse tools to analyze legal issues is consistent with our overall juris-
prudential bent toward antiformalism - "practical reason" or "pragmatism" - as opposed to 
foundationalist legal theory. See generally Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First 
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. R.Ev. 1615 (1987). 
Before we leave our parsing of the term "New Public Law," we note that in an important 
sense there is nothing "new" about analyzing public law from the viewpoints of public choice and 
republicanism. Public choice shares much with Blackstonian common law formalism, under 
which the legislature was seen as an unpredictable and unprincipled interloper into the preferred 
state of affairs, private ordering. See generally W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 1, ch. 3, 
§ 1. Republicanism, too, links up well with an earlier epoch of public law, the New Deal, in 
which judicial deference to legislative value judgments about the common good became the order 
of the day. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. R.Ev. 421 (1987). 
In a sense, when they are transported into the public law domain, public choice provides an 
axiomatic pedigree to Blackstonian formalism, and republicanism lends a historical, traditional 
aura to New Deal reformism. 
41. For an important earlier effort to apply the New Public Law to some "private law" 
problems, see Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 23 (1990). 
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law" and "public law" are antonyms. How, then, can the New Public 
Law have anything to say about the common law of torts? To address 
these concerns, we must first examine the distinction between public 
and private law.42 To the extent that this distinction has any remain-
ing vitality, it has little relevance to defining the scope of the New 
Public Law. 
We begin by considering the conventional classification of various 
fields oflaw.43 Torts and contracts are usually considered examples of 
private law; constitutional and administrative law exemplify public 
law. But it is hard to know what features of these examples are defini-
tive. Private law is often common law rather than statutory, but the 
Uniform Commercial Code has not converted Sales into public law, at 
least in the minds of law professors. Conversely, the use of common 
law methodologies does not make constitutional law, section 1983, or 
Title VII into private law fields.44 Procedurally, "public law" litiga-
tion often involves more parties, more flexible relief, and more judicial 
initiative than classic private law disputes, but it is not hard to find 
exceptions on both sides. 45 Often, the government is a party to public 
law litigation, but many important regulatory schemes rely in whole 
or in part on private litigation as an enforcement tool.46 None of these 
differences seems decisive. 
In an earlier age, the distinction between public and private law 
had deep jurisprudential roots. In nineteenth-century legal thought, 
the public/private distinction was founded on the idea of an autono-
42. Something more is at stake here than semantics. Speaking more generally of the public/ 
private distinction, Jack Balkin has recently observed that it has a kind of irrepressibility, so that 
even those who reject its meaningfulness are ultimately driven to recreate it. Balkin, Nested 
Oppositions (Book Review), 99 YALE L.J. 1669, 1687-88 (1990). 
43. When we first thought about our topic as a possible contribution to this symposium, we 
were unsure whether it fell under the rubric of the New Public Law. We solicited opinions from 
a variety of law professors about the meaning of "public law," and received almost an equally 
great variety of answers. The most striking answer was given (tongue in cheek) by a member of 
the Yale faculty, who opined that "public law is what too many people on this faculty want to 
teach." Another noteworthy definition is found in Justinian's Institutes: public law is that "con-
cerned with sacred rites, with priests, and with public officers." Pound, Public Law and Private 
Law, 24 CoRNELL L.Q. 469, 470 (1939). A cynic might note that both definitions fit the proto-
typical modern public law subject - constitutional law - pretty well, but even if that is true, 
neither is very useful for present purposes. 
44. Nor is the distinction between adjudication and rulemaking decisive; some rules (like the 
Miranda warnings) are created by courts, while some adjudication is performed by agencies such 
as the National Labor Relations Board, yet both are public law. 
45. Chayes's classic article suggested that these procedural features were unique to public 
law. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 
(1976). Similar features do exist in private law. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and 
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REv. 465, 466 (1980). 
46. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
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mous private order. 47 Private law was designed to protect these pre-
political rights. 48 Property law arbitrated disputes about ownership; 
tort law protected owners from unconsented intrusions; and contract 
law allowed owners to exchange property.49 Private law, then, was 
that part of the legal system protecting the private ordering; public law 
consisted of government compulsions restricting private freedom. 
This vision of a prelegal private ordering was a major target of the 
legal realists, and today has been attacked by critical legal scholars 
and neo-republicans. so They have argued cogently that the common 
law itself is based on choices of public policy. Today, in considering 
issues of contract, tort, or property law, it is almost second-nature to 
refer to considerations of public policy. Despite the realist critique, it 
may be possible to salvage something of the distinction between rules 
that uphold private ordering versus those that override private order-
ing. st Elaborating this distinction would be no easy matter, however, 
since most fields oflaw contain some rules of both types. sz Moreover, 
the distinction between facilitative and supervening legal rules may it-
self be problematic. Private law does not endorse all private activity. 
It attempts to distinguish between "coercive" and "voluntary" trans-
actions, to identify those actions that do further private preferences. 
These distinctions, however, are themselves often controversial.s3 
47. See Kennedy, Toward An Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of 
Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. L. & Soc. 3, 6-9 (1980). 
48. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1435 
(1988). 
49. Grey, supra note 1, at 48. 
50. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 1435-38; Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book Review), 76 
CALIF. L. REV. 465, 478-82 (1988). 
51. The realist/republican critique has a valid point but may be overstated to the extent that 
it portrays private preferences and transactions as wholly the creations of the legal system. Pri-
vate preferences are surely subject to government influence, but these preferences can also be 
quite resilient. For example, almost 50 years of intensive governmental efforts have failed to 
persuade the people of Eastern Europe of the virtues of communism. It is also perhaps unrealis-
tic to think that markets are purely creatures of government. Some markets, such as those for 
illegal drugs, can thrive without any supporting legal rules, and indeed in direct contravention of 
legal rules. 
52. For example, property law has many facilitative rules, but the Rule Against Perpetuities 
overrides private decisions. On the other hand, discrimination law is mostly considered public 
law, but at least some of its rules, such as sexual harassment standards, can also be seen as aimed 
at preventing coercive invasions of private rights. 
53. For example, if labor law is conceived as a means of overcoming an imbalance of bargain-
ing power, so as to allow workers to enter into truly voluntary bargains with employers, then the 
National Labor Relations Act is part of private contract law. On the other hand, the NLRA can 
also be considered a rent-seeking interference with the competitive labor market. Thus, a refer-
ence to "voluntary" exchanges requires a controversial and somewhat political judgment about 
the nature of labor markets. 
Similarly, in speaking of implementation of, rather than interference with, private prefer-
ences, we ignore the difficult problem of determining when behavior accurately reflects private 
preferences, rather than the effects of market failures, incomplete information, cognitive limita-
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If the private law /public law distinction retains any vitality after 
the realist critique, the line between the two is at best elusive. Fortu-
nately, we need not resolve the issue here. So far as we can see, 
whether republicanism and public choice are useful analytic tools does 
not depend on whether a legal rule is ultimately facilitative or 
supervening. 54 
We suggested earlier that the distinctive attribute of the New Pub-
lic Law is its explicit reliance on postpluralist political theory. 
Whether the New Public Law is useful in a particular instance de-
pends, consequently, on whether such political theory helps to solve 
the problem at hand. Thus, what determines the relevance of the New 
Public Law is not the substance of the legal issue, but whether an un-
derstanding of political institutions seems necessary. Not surprisingly, 
this most often occurs when the legal issue is formulated from the 
outset as relating to the proper role of government, or when the inter-
pretation of a governmental act is at stake. But even in other kinds of 
cases, the perspective of political theory may be important. 
In the "market" for legal ordering, the legislature is always a "po-
tential entrant." When a court is asked to make rules to govern a 
private transaction, it is often relevant that the legislature or its admin-
istrative agent are possible alternate decisionmakers.55 Indeed, today, 
some legislative act such as the Uniform Commercial Code is often 
implicated in even the most "private law" case. Once either legislation 
or the potential of legislation enters the case, the same political theo-
ries that have helped shape the New Public Law may become impor-
tant sources of insights regardless of whether the issue is considered 
public or private law. 
In short, we believe that the "New Public Law" is a misnomer. 
Although it has its origins in fields that were traditionally considered 
"public law," the applicability of this body of theory is only contill-
gently related to whatever remains of the public law /private law dis-
tinction. The New Public Law is potentially useful in analyzing a 
tions, or various personality disorders such as addiction that prevent individuals from imple-
menting their true preferences. See generally Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private 
Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129, 1173 (1986) (noting distortions in a system based on 
private preferences that require collective intervention). Again, drawing these lines will often be 
highly controversial. How we draw these lines determines, for example, to what extent consumer 
protection statutes are considered essentially private law. 
54. Nor, for that matter, does it have any necessary connection with the other possible indi-
cia of public versus private law, such as whether the government is a party to the case, whether 
the case involves prospective relief in a multipolar proceeding, or whether the case is common 
law or statutory. 
55. For example, the possibility of legislative action is important to fashioning stare decisis 
rules even in common law cases. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
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wide variety of legal problems outside the domain of public law, as 
classically understood. It is to a couple of brief illustrations of this 
point that we now turn. 
II. THE VIABILITY OF THE COMMON LAW IN THE 
AGE OF STATUTES 
In an age in which so much public policy is made by legislatures, 
the role of the common law can no longer be taken for granted. When 
a statute is directly applicable, it of course displaces any conflicting 
common law rules (constitutional limits aside).56 Our interest, how-
ever, is in situations where the existence of a statute may affect judicial 
policymaking outside of the statute's domain.57 
Traditionally, judges viewed the common law as a principled, her-
metically sealed system immune from all but clear statutory intru-
sions. 58 Statutes were "in the law," - they were formal requirements 
of positive law - but not "of the law" because they were the work of 
an unprincipled and unpredictable agency, the legislature. With the 
demise of most aspects of common law formalism and the rise of the 
age of statutes, courts began considering statutes as potential sources 
of worthwhile principles, rather than simply reflections of brute polit-
ical power. This development conceptualized the legislature as an ap-
propriate potential player in any common law policymaking dispute, 
not simply another government agency from which disappointed liti-
gants could seek relief. In essence, common law courts began viewing 
themselves as operating in the shadow of the legislature, especially 
where the legislature had enacted statutes having a penumbra! rela-
tionship with the common law problem at hand. 
Conceptualizing the legislature as a source of public policy has re-
56. See, e.g., Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 18 GEO. L.J. 281 
(1989). 
57. The two examples we will discuss are drawn from the federal common law. We have 
chosen them because we believe they illustrate our point effectively, because they are probably 
fairly well known to many public law scholars, and for the eminently practical reason that we 
know about them from our prior scholarship and teaching. By treating the federal common law 
as essentially similar for illustrative purposes with state common law, we are necessarily disagree· 
ing with any narrow, formalist conception of the federal sphere. Cf. Redish, Federal Common 
Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An ''Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 761 (1989). Although the domain offederal common law is more restricted (in part 
for the reasons that Redish discusses), we see no difference between the way federal common law 
functions within its domain and the way state common Jaw functions. (Although state judges do 
not have life tenure, we doubt that the electoral process can or should function as a referendum 
on common law rules, or that state judicial decisions in particular cases are shaped by electoral 
concerns.) Of course, even if we are wrong about the scope of the federal common law, what we 
say has relevance to the common Jaw in general. 
58. For an overview supporting this and the other points made in this paragraph, see W. 
EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 241-47. 
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publican connotations, and public choice is implicated when viewing 
the legislature as a potential entrant into any dispute about public pol-
icy. In this section, we illustrate the role that republicanism and pub-
lic choice might play in analyzing common law problems in the age of 
statutes. We examine two juxtapositions of statutes and the common 
law from republican and public choice perspectives. Both situations 
involve torts, traditionally a paradigm "private law" field. In both, 
however, applying the New Public Law provides insights into the ap-
propriate judicial role. 
The common law and statutes may interact in two distinct ways. 
In tort law, for example, conduct is often subject to a case-by-case 
judgment about reasonableness. In these cases, judicial policymaking 
takes place at the microlevel, when the common law rule of reasona-
bleness or balancing is applied. If the legislature later adopts a statute 
regulating conduct subject to this kind of common law rule, the ques-
tion becomes whether such microlevel judicial policy decisions have 
become inappropriate. Here, a legislative scheme may result in a cur-
tailment or even the abandonment of the common law approach. We 
illustrate this question by examining whether the Supreme Court 
should have abandoned the established federal common law of inter-
state nuisance in light of the adoption of the Clean Water Act. 
In our second example, we consider an instance in which the com-
mon law, contrary to its usual approach of case-by-case judgments 
about reasonableness, has a flat rule barring recovery for injuries aris-
ing from certain conduct. Suppose that the legislature later adopts 
statutes inconsistent with the policies underlying the common law rule 
but not directly abrogating it. Should the courts administer the coup 
de grace to what remains of the common law rule, in deference to the 
legislature's policy judgment? Or, on the contrary, should the courts 
consider what remains of the common law frozen, in deference to the 
legislature's possible assumption of policymaking responsibility over 
the subject matter? 
While disputes of these two kinds are frequently before the courts, 
they have received relatively little systematic attention from scholars. 
Our purpose in this Part is to explore these issues from the perspective 
of the New Public Law. Not surprisingly, considering the normative 
and empirical issues that lurk in these cases, republicanism and public 
choice help in analyzing these common law problems. 
A. Micro-Policymaking Within Existing Common Law Rules 
The micro-policymaking issue is nicely posed by a series of cases 
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dealing with the federal common law of interstate nuisance. 59 The 
pivotal decision is City of Milwaukee v. Illinois [Milwaukee II], 60 but 
some background is necessary to put the opinion into perspective. 
The federal common law of interstate nuisance traces back to 
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 61 an original action against a Tennes-
see company whose pollution was causing widespread damage in 
Georgia. The Supreme Court entertained the action because the dis-
pute involved the state of Georgia's quasi-sovereign interest in its air 
quality: 
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside 
nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to 
whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of mak-
ing reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-sov-
ereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in this court. 62 
In a similar case, seeking to take advantage of the Supreme Court's 
original jurisdiction, Illinois filed a nuisance action against the City of 
Milwaukee, alleging that Milwaukee was discharging 200 million gal-
lons of untreated sewage into Lake Michigan daily. In Illinois v. City 
of Milwaukee [Milwaukee I], 63 a unanimous Court dismissed the origi-
nal action on the ground that Illinois had an alternate remedy in fed-
eral district court. The Court held that the federal common law of 
nuisance was a proper basis for federal question jurisdiction. In recog-
nizing a federal cause of action, the Court relied on three factors: (1) 
the quasi-sovereign nature of the state's interest;64 (2) the need for a 
uniform rule of decision governing nuisance in interstate waters;65 and 
(3) strong congressional concern over water pollution. 66 
Soon after the decision in Milwaukee /, Congress substantially 
amended the federal water pollution statute, creating what is now 
called the Clean Water Act.67 In Milwaukee I/, almost a decade later, 
59. This problem is not unique to the federal courts. For example, in Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 222-23, 226, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314-15 (1970), 
the court held that in fashioning an appropriate remedy in a nuisance case, only the interests of 
the private parties before the court should be considered, rather than the broad public interest in 
controlling air pollution. Since the public interest is a traditional factor in shaping equitable 
decrees, see, e.g., D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 65 (1973); Shane, Rights, 
Remedies and Restraint, 64 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 531, 565 (1988), this is a retreat from the tradi· 
tional policymaking role of the courts. 
60. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
61. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
62. 206 U.S. at 237. 
63. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
64. 406 U.S. at 104-05, 107. 
65. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6, 107 n.9. 
66. 406 U.S. at 101-02. 
67. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92·500, 86 Stat. 
816 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., IS U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 33 U.S.C.). For a 
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the Supreme Court held that the 1972 Amendments preempted the 
federal common law of nuisance. The Court began with the proposi-
tions that the federal courts, unlike state courts, are not courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction and that the creation of a federal rule of decision is 
generally the job of Congress; federal common law is thus the excep-
tion rather than the rule. 68 (As we explain later, we consider this em-
phasis on the unique nature of federal common law to be a red 
herring. 69) The Court reasoned that the federal regulatory scheme dis-
placed the "often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and 
maxims of equity jurisdiction" embodied in the federal common law of 
nuisance. 70 
Two later cases complete the story of interstate nuisance law. In 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Asso-
ciation, 71 the Court held that the federal common law of nuisance was 
preempted even though, as the dissent pointed out, the defendants vio-
lated the federal pollution statute.72 But in International Paper Co. v. 
Ouellette, 73 the Court allowed a diversity action against an interstate 
polluter, ruling that the Clean Water Act preempts the federal com-
mon law and the nuisance law of the receiving state, but does not pre-
empt the nuisance law of the discharging state. 74 The latter 
conclusion was well-nigh unavoidable because the Clean Water Act 
contains a powerful savings clause.75 The upshot is that there is no 
discussion of the 1972 amendments, see R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIAIS 264-65 (2d ed. 1985). 
68. 451 U.S. at 312-13. 
69. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83. Moreover, we doubt if the Milwaukee II 
Court's reservations about the legitimate scope of federal common law remain good law after 
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988). For further discussion of Boyle, see 
note 113 infra. 
70. 451 U.S. at 317, 319-26. "It would be quite inconsistent" with the federal statutory 
scheme, the Court said, "if federal courts were in effect to 'write their own ticket' under the guise 
of federal common law after permits have already been issued and permittees have been planning 
and operating in reliance on them." 451 U.S. at 326. Notably, in support of its conclusion that 
the federal common law was displaced, the Court relied on Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 
436 U.S. 618 (1978), a case we discuss in section 11.B infra. 
71. 453 U.S. 1 (1981). Other aspects of Sea Clammers are discussed in Sunstein, Section 
1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 394 (1982). 
72. See 453 U.S. at 31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
73. 479 U.S. 481 (1987). 
74. Public choice suggests a major risk of rent-seeking legislation by the discharging state, 
because polluters are likely to be effective lobbyists when their victims are out-of-state. This risk 
of political favoritism toward local firms is traditionally a rationale for federal court intervention 
under the dormant commerce clause. See generally Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Consti-
tution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1705-08 (1984). 
75. Section 510 of the Act provides: 
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or 
deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to adopt or 
enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any re-
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federal common 1aw of nuisance, but common law cases can still be 
heard in diversity by federal courts sitting in the receiving state, pro-
vided that the nuisance law of the discharging state is applied. 
Applying the New Public Law might have benefited the analysis of 
the Milwaukee II Court. In a sense, the Court attributed both too 
much to the statute and too little. To the extent that the Court re-
garded the statute as a complete legislative resolution of all the com-
peting interests, the Court attributed too much comprehensiveness to 
the legislature. Public choice teaches that a statute reflects not only 
the preferences of the legislature, but also the procedural obstacle 
course of enactment.76 The fact that a statute explicitly regulates situ-
ations A and B, but not C: should not necessarily be interpreted as a 
decision to immunize C from regulation. It may only indicate that, for 
whatever reason, the legislative process failed to produce a bill cover-
ing C. Thus, the meandering boundaries of a statute may reflect only 
the exigencies of the legislative process rather than any majority view 
about the treatment of excluded cases. 
In another sense, the Milwaukee II Court attributed too little to 
the legislature. In Milwaukee I, the Court viewed federal pollution 
legislation not only as a collection of specific regulations, but as em-
bodying a public value. 77 In Milwaukee II, the Court carefully parsed 
specific clauses in the statute, finding them not to be decisive. 78 It 
ignored, however, the larger message of the statute, which was Con-
gress' deep concern over water pollution. Here, republicanism has a 
useful message about the legislative role in articulating public values. 79 
Congress' strong endorsement of environmental values should have re-
inforced the Court's own support for those values. It is deeply ironic 
quirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that if a [federal require· 
ment] is in effect under this chapter, such State or political subdivision or interstate agency 
may not adopt or enforce any [requirement] which is less stringent •.. ; or (2) be construed 
as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to 
the waters (including boundary waters) of such States. 
33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1988). A contrary ruling in Ouellette would also have left pollution victims 
without any damage remedy, because the Clean Water Act provides none. It seems doubtful 
indeed that Congress intended such a result. Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 
251 (1984). 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. 
77. Milwaukee l 406 U.S. at 101-02 (noting the broad environmental goals of federal pollu· 
tion legislation). 
78. 451 U.S. at 327-29. 
79. See, e.g., Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 
1009 (1989) (discussing "the substantial role public values already play in statutory interprela· 
tion, the potential role they might play, and the values that ought to be considered"); Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 413 (1989) (describing and 
defending normative principles to guide statutory interpretation). 
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that the Court took a legislative endorsement of environmentalism as a 
message for judges to withdraw common law restrictions on pollution. 
We are sympathetic to the concerns animating the Milwaukee II 
opinion. Courts need to be aware of their limited ability to deal with 
technical environmental issues. Courts also need to be sensitive to the 
danger that common law doctrines can undermine legislative policy 
judgments. 80 Nevertheless, Milwaukee II simply fails to serve these 
policies effectively, or any others that we can think of. 
The Court observed that, since Erie, there is no general federal 
common law.81 The Milwaukee II Court seems to view this doctrine 
as reflecting an allocation of authority between the federal courts and 
Congress. But Erie plainly rests on federalism rather than on any pro-
tection of federal prerogatives, as shown by the Erie Court's sugges-
tion that the Rules of Decision Act would be unconstitutional if 
construed to authorize the application of federal common law in diver-
sity cases. 82 Thus, Erie has little to do with the concerns about legisla-
tive supremacy animating Milwaukee II. 83 In any event, the decision 
in Milwaukee II actually disserved both the values of federalism and 
legislative supremacy. 
With regard to federalism, the doctrine derived under Milwaukee 
II derogates from the receiving state's quasi-sovereign interest in the 
integrity of its air and water, recognized in Milwaukee I and Tennessee 
Copper. 84 Rather than retaining the ability to apply its own law, or 
the neutral rules of the federal common law, the receiving state is 
forced to rely on whatever relief the rules of the discharging state 
might provide. 85 Indeed, Ouellette manages to offend even the dis-
charging state's autonomy: in a footnote, the Court stated that the 
discharging state's nuisance law must be applied even if that state's 
80. For example, the tradition of equitable discretion can undermine the policy judgments 
embodied in modern environmental statutes. Ironically, in light of his opinion in Milwaukee JI, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist has been insensitive to this problem. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 211-13 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that despite finding a viola-
tion of the Endangered Species Act, the district court could, in the exercise ofits equitable discre-
tion, refuse to enjoin completion of the Tellico Dam). See generally Farber, Equitable Discretion, 
Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. Prrr. L. R.Ev. 513 (1984). 
81. 451 U.S. at 312-13. 
82. See Westen & Lehman, Is There Life far Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. 
REV. 311, 338 (1980). 
83. See Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. l, 13 
(1985). 
84. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64. 
85. Despite some contrary dicta in Ouellette, the Tenth Circuit has recently held that the 
receiving state can have its water-quality standards incorporated into the discharge permit. 
Oklahoma v. EPA, 908 F.2d 595, 607-08 (10th Cir. 1990). If this decision stands, it will partially 
mitigate Ouellette's injury to federalism values. 
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own choice of law rules point elsewhere. 86 Thus, Milwaukee II has 
hardly been a victory for "state's rights." 
Milwaukee II is also indefensible from the perspective of legislative 
supremacy. The Court failed to point to any statutory language or 
legislative history showing hostility to the federal common law of nui-
sance. What evidence does exist, such as the savings clause for state 
laws, shows that Congress intended to supplement rather than dis-
place other remedies for pollution. 87 Furthermore, the Court's claim 
that its holding will assist in implementing the statutory scheme is 
contrary to the view of environmental law experts, 88 and is belied by 
the fact that the Environmental Protection Agency and the Depart-
ment of Justice urged continued acceptance of the federal common 
law.89 
Milwaukee II might have been defended for at least reducing the 
federal court caseload and for taking judgments about pollution law 
away from federal judges in favor of expert agencies. But Ouellette 
eliminates these defenses. After Ouellette, most interstate pollution 
suits can still be brought in federal court as diversity cases, and federal 
judges will then be making policy judgments (under state law stan-
dards) about the proper remedies against polluters. The only differ-
ence Milwaukee II has made is that such cases will not be decided 
under a uniform and neutral body of law, but instead under fifty sepa-
rate versions of nuisance doctrine.9° 
This is not to say that, in deciding the Milwaukee case, the Court 
should have ignored the Clean Water Act. Indeed, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision, which was reversed in Milwaukee IL demonstrates 
how judges can harmonize the common law with a complex statutory 
scheme. Judge Tone's opinion for the Court of Appeals repeatedly 
turned to the federal regulatory scheme as a source of guidance. In 
Judge Tone's view, the statute implied the undesirability of discharg-
ing untreated sewage,91 and the EPA regulations indicated a presump-
tive balance between cost and water quality needs.92 In short, Judge 
Tone used the statute in republican fashion as a source of public val-
86. 479 U.S. at 499 n.20. 
87. For a fuller discussion, see 451 U.S. at 33947 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
88. See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
758-59 (2d ed. 1990) (quoting Hearings on S.777 and S.2652 before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Environmental Pollution, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 654-55 (1982)). 
89. 451 U.S. at 34647 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
90. Although the common law probably does not vary dramatically between states, Ouellette 
gives states an incentive to pass statutes protecting local dischargers from suit. See supra note 74. 
91. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 170-72 (1979). 
92. 599 F.2d at 173-75. 
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ues.93 In our view, by doing so, the Seventh Circuit showed more re-
spect for the legislature's policymaking than did the Supreme Court's 
formalist bow toward legislative supremacy. 
The lesson of Milwaukee II is that policymaking is not a zero-sum 
g~me, as Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Milwaukee II seems to con-
template. A decrease in the role of the federal judiciary is not neces-
sarily a victory for congressional prerogatives.94 Because it conceived 
of federal common law only as a competitor with legislation, Mil-
waukee II missed the opportunity for beneficial cooperation between 
legislators and common law judges. A touch of republican dialogue 
between Congress and the Court would have been far more 
productive. 
The fundamental flaw in Justice Rehnquist's opinion may be a lack 
of what Karl Llewellyn called "situation sense" - the ability to grasp 
the essential policy contours of a fact situation.95 Rehnquist grasped 
the right policies; he simply applied them in the wrong case. Practical 
reason involves the ability to move from the general to the particular. 
Without it, general theories remain sterile and unhelpful in deciding 
cases. 
B. Common Law Reform 
In Milwaukee II, the Court beat a hurried retreat from its prior 
common law role in the face of a legislative presence. A more com-
mon response to a partial legislative reform had been to freeze the 
common law, deferring further reform efforts to the legislature.96 On 
the other hand, some courts have proceeded despite - or even be-
cause of - a legislative effort to address part of the problem. 
The possibilities for common law creativity in a largely statutory 
setting are illustrated by Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. 97 Un-
93. Judge Tone stated: 
A statute that does not by its terms govern the case before a court may contain indications 
of the legislature's judgment on relevant issues of policy or provide an appropriate principle 
for decision of the case. In applying the federal common law of nuisance in a water pollu-
tion case, a court should not ignore the Act but should look to its policies and principles for 
guidance. 
599 F.2d at 164 (footnote omitted). 
94. Nor is it even necessarily a victory for the collective prerogatives of the states, as we saw 
earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86. 
95. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMON LAW TRAnmoN: DECIDING APPEALS 268-85 
(1960). 
96. See Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, 50 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 563-70 (1982). 
97. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). Although no doubt to many scholars Moragne is just some obscure 
admiralty case, the problems it illustrates, and the quality of Justice Harlan's opinion in the case, 
have interested many scholars concerned with the relationship between the common law and 
896 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:875 
derstanding Moragne requires a brief review of the history of personal 
injury law. Under British tort law, transplanted to America, there was 
no cause of action for wrongful death.98 Accordingly, it was consider-
ably wiser - or at least, more profitable - to kill people than to maim 
them. In the nineteenth century, American state legislatures abolished 
this absurd rule by establishing statutory rights to sue for wrongful 
death.99 For wrongful deaths of seaworkers, Congress also enacted 
remedial legislation in 1920. The Jones Act100 provides a cause of ac-
tion for the negligent death of a seaman, and the federal Death on the 
High Seas Act101 (DOHSA) establishes a cause of action for wrongful 
death of workers on the high seas - outside the territorial waters of 
the United States - "caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default." 
To simplify somewhat, in Moragne a widow attempted to bring an 
action for the wrongful death of her husband, who had died from inju-
ries suffered in American territorial waters. Her claim was that the 
vessel was "unseaworthy," and the common law recognized a well es-
tablished cause of action for injuries that result from such condi-
tions.102 Her claim did not fit the federal wrongful death statutes, 
however. The Jones Act reaches wrongful death in the territorial wa-
ters, but it is limited to negligence claims; 103 DOHSA encompasses 
unseaworthiness actions, but reaches only wrongful death on the high 
seas.104 In short, Ms. Moragne had fallen into a hole in the statutes 
due to the combination of the nature of the wrongful conduct and the 
place of the accident. The only other law to apply, federal maritime 
common law, would preclude her action as well, because of the old 
rule against recovery for wrongful death. 
What was obviously needed in Moragne was some way to update 
legislation. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 150·59 
(1982); W. EsKRIDGE & P. F'RICKEY, supra note 1, at 247-63; G. GILMORE & c. BLACK, THE 
LAW OF ADMIRALTY 367-74 (2d ed. 1975); Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes 
and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REv. 213, 254-56 (1983); Williams, supra note 96, at 
561-62, 564-65; Note, The Legitimacy of Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice 
Harlan's Contribution, 82 YALE L.J. 258 (1972). But cf Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Real-
ism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RE.s. L. REV. 179, 201-
03 (1986) (questioning analysis in Moragne). 
98. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 125A, at 940-42. 
99. Id. 
100. Pub. L. No. 97-389, 96 Stat. 1955 (1982) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988)). 
101. Death on the High Seas Act, ch. 111, 41 Stat. 537 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 
U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (1988)). 
102. 398 U.S. at 376. 
103. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (1988) (incorporating by reference negligence cause of ac-
tion in 45 U.S.C. § 51). Also, the Jones Act provides relief only for "seamen," 46 U.S.C. app. 
§ 688(a) (1988), and Mr. Moragne was a longshoreman. 
104. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (1988). 
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federal law. The statutory language was not easily ,amenable to any 
construction that would allow her recovery. The more obvious solu.: 
tion was to abandon the old common law rule, which the Supreme 
Court did in Moragne in a well-crafted opinion by Justice Harlan.105 
Justice Harlan concluded that Congress in 1920 was simply fixing 
the problems squarely presented to it, not comprehensively addressing 
- and thus freezing - an entire area of law.106 Drawing not only 
from the federal maritime statutes but also from the consistent pattern 
of state statutes, Justice Harlan found a well-established public value 
in favor of recovery for wrongful death. Although Justice Harlan had 
probably never heard of civic republicanism, his decision combined 
high judicial craftsmanship with republican attention to the legisla-
ture's role in articulating pµblic values. 101 
105. In jettisoning the old common law rule, Justice Harlan in Moragne was required to 
overrule an aged precedent, 11ze Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886). His opinion in Moragne con-
tains one of the Court's most thoughtful expressions of the role of stare decisis and its appropri-
ate limitations. See 398 U.S. at 403-05. 
Recently, Lawrence Marshall proposed a seemingly absolute rule of stare decisis not only for 
the Court's statutory interpretation opinions, but also for its federal common law decisions. See 
Marshall, ''Let Congress Do It": 11ze Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 
MICH. L. REV. 177, 222 (1989). Marshall justified his view about the federal common law by 
suggesting that "[i]t is surely not unrealistic to expect Congress to monitor the handful offederal 
common-law decisions the Supreme Court issues each year." Id. at 222 n.210. For reasons 
illuminated by public choice theory, see infra note 113 and accompanying text, it is Marshall's 
proposal that seems unrealistic in the context of Moragne. Moreover, if Congress monitors only 
the Court's current decisions, it will be left unaware of derelicts like 11ze Harrisburg. (After all, if 
the Court followed an absolute rule of stare decisis, it would have had no reason to grant certio-
rari in Moragne.) For another response to Marshall's proposal, and Marshall's reply to the criti-
cism, see Eskridge, 11ze Case of the Amorous Defendant: Criti'cizzizg Absolute Stare Decisis for 
Statutory Coses, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2450 (1990); Marshall, Contempt of Congress: A Reply to the 
Critics of An Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2467 (1990). 
106. In considering the potential negative implications of the DOHSA, Justice Harlan thor-
oughly reviewed the legislative history and concluded: 
Read in light of the state of maritime law in 1920, we believe this legislative history 
indicates that Congress intended to ensure the continued availability of a remedy, histori-
cally provided by the States, for deaths in territorial waters; its failure to extend the Act to 
cover such deaths primarily reflected the lack of necessity for coverage by a federal statute, 
rather than an affirmative desire to insulate such deaths from the benefits of any federal 
remedy that might be available independently of the Act. The void that existed in maritime 
law up until 1920 was the absence of any remedy for wrongful death on the high seas. 
Congress, in acting to fill that void, legislated only to the three-mile limit because that was 
the extent of the problem. The express provision that state remedies in territorial waters 
were not disturbed by the Act ensured that Congress' solution of one problem would not 
create another by inviting the courts to find that the Act pre-empted the entire field, destroy-
ing the state remedies that had previously existed. 
398 U.S. at 397-98 (footnote omitted). We see no indication that Congress was concerned about 
preserving the prerogative of the state to deny relief as a matter of federalism - particularly 
given that the causes of action for death in territorial waters remain federal. 
107. In concluding that the federal and state wrongful death statutes contained a public 
value that should be borrowed for updating the common law, Justice Harlan drew upon com-
mentaries by Roscoe Pound and James Landis. See 398 U.S. at 391-92 (relying upon Landis, 
Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYS 213, 226-27 (1934); Pound, Com-
ments on Recent Important Admiralty Cases. 13 NACAA L.J. 162, 188-89 (1954)). Other vener-
able and valuable discussions are Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 679, 
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This interpretation is not the only possible reading of Moragne. 
The opinion can also be read, as Judge Posner reads it, 108 in a more 
purist "legal process" mode. On this reading, the opinion is primarily 
motivated by a concern for the "neutral principle" of legal coherence; 
under this view, Harlan's primary concern is eliminating a legal anom-
aly. While not without support, however, this interpretation is belied 
by the structure of the opinion. Harlan begins by rejecting The Harris-
burg's preclusion of wrongful death recoveries as normatively untena-
ble. He only then turns to "legal process" issues like coherence in a 
defensive posture, to determine whether the normatively attractive re-
sult is blocked by process arguments. 
The Moragne setting also illuminates how public choice can pro-
vide insights for the judicial role in common law cases. The interest 
groups lobbying for statutes like the Jones Act and DOHSA are likely 
to focus on particular problems, not system-wide inquiries that may 
complicate passage of legislation. The failure of the various statutes to 
reach the precise situation of Ms. Moragne carries no plausible impli-
cation of a congressional desire to leave her remediless: it is hard to 
imagine that the deal underlying this series of statutes was to compen-
sate the families of all victims of tortious conduct except those who 
were killed within three miles offshore of certain states. Thus, public 
choice warns against reading negative implications into the precise 
contours of the complicated statutory scheme. 
In Moragne, Justice Harlan overtly shaded the inquiry whether a 
congressional deal precluded adoption of republican values. He noted 
that legislation sometimes embodies general public policies that courts 
should apply beyond the statute's domain - the republican insight -
and at other times reflects hard-fought compromises between conflict-
ing interests that should not be undone by judicial elaboration - the 
public choice perspective.109 Based on the existence of the Jones Act, 
690-93 (1935); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383 (1908); and Stone, 
The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REv. 4, 12-13 (1936). 
108. See Posner, supra note 97, at 201-03. 
109. Justice Harlan wrote: 
The legislature does not, of course, merely enact general policies. By the terms of a 
statute, it also indicates its conception of the sphere within which the policy is to have effect. 
In many cases the scope of a statute may reflect nothing more than the dimensions of the 
particular problem that came to the attention of the legislature, inviting the conclusion that 
the legislative policy is equally applicable to other situations in which the mischief is identi-
cal. This conclusion is reinforced where there exists not one enactment but a course of 
legislation dealing with a series of situations, and where the generality of the underlying 
principle is attested by the legislation of other jurisdictions. On the other hand, the legisla-
ture may, in order to promote other, conflicting interests, prescribe with particularity the 
compass of the legislative aim, erecting a strong inference that territories beyond the bound-
aries so drawn are not to feel the impact of the new legislative dispensation. 
398 U.S. at 392 (citation omitted). 
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DOHSA, and a variety of nonmaritime federal wrongful death stat-
utes, he concluded that "Congress has established a policy favoring 
recovery in the absence of a legislative direction to except a particular 
class of cases."110 He then framed the essential issue in Moragne as 
whether "Congress has given [any] affirmative indication of an intent 
to preclude the judicial allowance of a remedy for wrongful death to 
persons in the situation of this petitioner."111 In essence, Justice 
Harlan presumed the appropriateness of the republican outcome ab-
sent a clear statement by Congress. This tactic, usually found in a 
variety of "public law" cases, 112 places the heavy burden of legislative 
silence on the "nonrepublican" side of the case. 
Like republicanism, public choice also has some implications about 
the proper placement of the burden of legislative inertia. Ms. 
Moragne and similarly situated persons have no idea that they are 
without remedy until they suffer the loss of a loved one; they have no 
incentive to organize before the fact to lobby for remedial legislation. 
Such large, diffuse, unorganized groups are, according to public 
choice, the least likely to lobby successfully for legislative action. Un-
ions may provide a mechanism for overcoming this collective action 
problem in some contexts. Even within the union membership, how-
ever, this group likely is too inchoate to carry any weight. The nature 
of the defendants in a case like Moragne provides a stark contrast. 
Shipping companies have the problem of compensating work-related 
injuries every day, in contrast to the one-time tragedy suffered by Ms. 
Moragne. These companies are small in number, easily identified, and 
have the resources to lobby Congress - public choice predicts that 
they can organize and protect themselves in the legislative arena. The 
industry, in short, is well positioned to obtain congressional relief from 
any harshness resulting from the application of Moragne to future in-
juries; the Ms. Moragnes of the world are unlikely to obtain legislative 
relief before their respective losses occur.113 
110. 398 U.S. at 393. 
111. 398 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added). 
112. See Eskridge, supra note 69, at 1045-49; Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Rea-
soning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 18 CALIF. L. R.E.v. 1139 (1990); Sun-
stein, supra note 69, at 471. 
113. A more recent decision is considerably less adept. In Boyle v. United Technologies 
Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), a military supplier was sued after a marine was killed in the crash of 
a defective helicopter. Over a strong dissent, the Court established a new federal defense for 
military contractors, freeing them from liability so Jong as they warned the government about 
product defects. 487 U.S. at 512. This was a dramatic expansion in the federal common Jaw, 
undertaken without regard to the serious concerns about judicial policymaking voiced in Mil-
waukee IL As the dissent pointed out, government contractors had conducted a vigorous but 
unsuccessful lobbying campaign to get this exemption from Congress. 487 U.S. at 515, n.1 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Public choice suggests that the burden of legislative inertia would have 
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Following Moragne, the Supreme Court engaged in a tortuous ef-
fort to fit the common law cause of action for wrongful death resulting 
from unseaworthiness within the broader framework of the maritime 
statutes. In Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 114 a sharply divided Court 
held that, because the Moragne cause of action was common law in 
nature, modem common law rules defining damages recoverable 
should apply; recovery could thus include certain nonpecuniary losses 
such as loss of society. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 115 how-
ever, the Court confined the Moragne cause of action to territorial wa-
ters - thereby relegating the surviving spouse of a seaworker killed on 
the high seas to damages only as provided for in DOHSA, which ex-
plicitly limits recovery to pecuniary loss. 116 Most recently, in Miles v. 
Apex Marine Corp., 117 the Court held that damages for wrongful loss 
of society cannot be recovered in a Moragne action brought on behalf 
of a seaman, 118 limiting Gaudet to actions for injuries to longshoremen 
in territorial waters - a limitation that leaves Gaudet little or no prac-
tical application.119 
Formalistically, the post-Moragne cases make some sense. In 
Gaudet no statute applied, and so (modem) common law principles 
controlled; in Higginbotham and Miles, DOHSA or the Jones Act ap-
plied, and thus plaintiff was stuck with the (arguably obsolescent) re-
covery provided in those statutes. After the two most recent decisions, 
Moragne essentially does little more than eliminate the phrase "high 
seas" from the title of DOHSA, extending the statutory remedy land-
ward. The policy of uniformity, which was one of the Moragne 
Court's concerns, has been fully served, 120 but at the expense of the 
Moragne Court's even stronger desire to provide a just remedy for the 
survivors of maritime workers. 
been properly placed on these firms, which are well-organized, politically powerful, and wealthy. 
Unfortunately, the Court instead placed the burden of seeking new legislation on the widows and 
orphans of soldiers. 
114. 414 U.S. 573 (1974). 
115. 436 U.S. 618 (1978). 
116. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1988) ("a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss 
sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought") (emphasis added). 
117. 111 S. Ct. 317 (1990). 
118. 111 S. Ct. at 326. A second holding in Miles, which we will not discuss, limits the 
recovery of lost earnings in maritime wrongful death actions. See 111 S. Ct. at 326-28. 
119. 111 S. Ct. at 325. As the Court notes elsewhere in its opinion, unseaworthiness actions 
may no longer be brought by longshoremen because of a 1972 statute, which created a different 
compensation scheme for these workers. 111 S. Ct. at 323. Consequently, Gaudet seems not to 
apply under any circumstances at all. 
120. As the Miles Court observed, its decision eliminated the disparity created by Gaudet 
and Higginbotham between the measure of damages for wrongful death on the high seas and that 
in territorial waters. 11 S. Ct. at 326. 
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A brief evaluation of the post-Moragne cases from the perspective 
of the New Public Law is illuminating. Moragne relied upon republi-
can principles - that the common law of torts presumptively embod-
ies modem public values, including recovery for wrongful death. 
Gaudet stressed this same factor in following the "clear majority of 
States"121 and "the humanitarian policy of the maritime law to show 
'special solicitude' for those who are injured within its jurisdiction."122 
The dissenters in Gaudet saw Moragne much differently, as simply a 
gap-filling decision where the precise contours of DOHSA were 
adopted by analogy to the common law.123 In essence, the dispute in 
Gaudet was between finding a republican concept in DOHSA to be 
elaborated upon in defining the modem common law and finding a 
congressional conception of the appropriate rule of law that, even if 
outdated, should be applied to promote legal uniformity. The Gaudet 
dissenters' position is inconsistent with Moragne's public choice in-
sights - that the political dynamics surrounding passage of the Jones 
Act and DOHSA indicate no congressional intent to prescribe fixed 
rules for all wrongful deaths on the waters. 
Higginbotham is a harder case because DOHSA squarely applied 
and provided only for recovery of pecuniary loss. Allowing the plain-
tiff to recover nonpecuniary loss might seem equivalent to Guido Cala-
bresi's proposal that judges simply discard statutes because they have 
lost majority support or are incompatible with the legal landscape.124 
Although we have serious qualms about Calabresi's approach, 125 we 
doubt that one need go so far to support the conclusion that Higgin-
botham is at least questionable. 
Higginbotham concluded that the Court need not engage in repub-
lican inquiries about public values because "Congress has struck the 
balance for us."126 At :rµost, however, the principle of legislative 
supremacy is violated only when a court refuses to follow a clear legis-
lative command.127 Higginbotham assumed that such a command was 
121. 414 U.S. at 587. 
122. 414 U.S. at 588. 
123. See 414 U.S. at 596 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
124. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 97, at 148. 
125. See D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, supra note 8, at 106-08. 
126. 436 U.S. at 623. 
127. See Farber, supra note 56, at 282; Eskridge, supra note 39, at 1496-97, 1542-44. We say 
"at most" because while that is the view of one of us, the other has waffied on this point. See 
Frickey, supra note 112, at 1213-17. Although we pretty much agree on the principle, we might 
disagree in some cases whether there is a legislative "command," and if there is one whether 
there has been a clear violation of it. Also, even the Farber view leaves some room for maneuver 
in the face of changed circumstances. See Farber, supra note 56, at 307-09. 
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present in DOHSA, but that conclusion is at least overstated, if not 
wrong. 
First, the statutory language at issue granted a "fair and just com-
pensation for the pecuniary loss sustained."12s Nowhere does it say 
that nonpecuniary loss cannot be recovered. The majority's conclu-
sion that this section reflected Congress' "considered judgment"129 to 
reject nonpecuniary damages is unsupported by reference to any legis-
lative history. Indeed, the legislative history of DOHSA, as inter-
preted in Moragne, suggests that Congress had simply fixed some 
particular problems brought before it by incorporating the tort values 
of the era, not necessarily freezing the law to reflect forevermore the 
1920s conceptions of how to implement those values.130 In this re-
spect, the majority's statement in Higginbotham that "[t]here is a basic 
difference between filling a gap left by Congress' silence and rewriting 
rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted"131 
seems defensible but also somewhat attenuated. In all events, it con-
flicts with Justice Harlan's conclusion in Moragne that "no intention 
appears that the Act have the effect of foreclosing any nonstatutory 
federal remedies that might be found appropriate to effectuate the poli-
cies of general maritime law."132 
In short, Moragne and Gaudet saw our "general law" - DOHSA, 
state wrongful death statutes, and current values - as promoting a 
case-by-case search for solutions that best effectuate the humanitarian 
policies of the maritime faw. In. contrast, Higginbotham treated 
DOHSA like a bill of lading. For us, the appropriate resolution of 
Higginbotham should have turned on a republican evaluation of the 
policies at issue (for example, is recovery of nonpecuniary loss really 
necessary to effectuate modem humanitarian policies?) and a public 
choice inquiry into the "deal" - if any - struck in the 1920 Con-
gress. If the outcome in Higginbotham is correct, it is not for the rea-
sons expressed by the majority.133 
128. 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (1988). 
129. 436 U.S. at 624. 
130. See 398 U.S. at 397-402. 
131. 436 U.S. at 625. 
132. 398 U.S. at 400. 
133. Indeed, the plausibility of a contrary outcome in Higginbotham is suggested by the sen· 
sible opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska in a somewhat similar case. In Selders v. Ar· 
mentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 277, 207 N.W.2d 686, 687 (1973), the Nebraska court allowed parents 
to recover nonpecuniary loss for the wrongful death of a minor child under a wrongful death 
statute that provided that the "avails of" the wrongful death action "shall be paid to and distrib· 
uted among the widow or widower and next of kin in the proportion that the pecuniary loss 
suffered by each bears to the total pecuniary loss suffered by all such persons." The majority 
explained that the full language of the statute did not compel any limitation of recovery to pecu-
niary loss: the wrongful death cause of action was for "damages," not "pecuniary damages," and 
February 1991] Common Law 903 
Miles completed the Court's retreat from the creative judicial role 
contemplated by Moragne. The Miles Court held that damages for 
loss of society are unavailable in a Moragne action because such dam-
ages are unavailable under the Jones Act. It would be "inconsistent 
with our place in the constitutional scheme were we to sanction more 
expansive remedies in a judicially-created cause of action in which lia-
bility is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases of death re-
sulting from negligence."134 A close reading of the opinion suggests, 
however, that this judicial modesty is misplaced. If Congress had re-
jected nonpecuniary damages in the Jones Act, perhaps there would be 
some basis for judicial deference in fashioning the common law rem-
edy. In reality, however, there was no legislative decision to which to 
defer. 
The Jones Act itself contains no limitation on the types of damages 
recoverable. It borrowed its language from the FELA, which pro-
vided a federal remedy for injuries to railroad workers. The FELA 
also contained no express limitation on damages, but the Supreme 
Court read such a limitation into the FELA in 1913.135 It was this 
decision that formed the basis for the ruling in Miles. Since Congress 
said nothing to the contrary, according to the Miles Court, it "must 
have intended" to incorporate this judicial gloss when it passed the 
Jones Act. 136 In short, what the Court proclaims as judicial deference 
to the legislature, turns out really to be the 1990 Court's deference to a 
decision by the 1913 Court under a different statute. Congress is "as-
sumed" to have agreed with the 1913 Court,137 so the current Court 
that the provision above simply governed the apportionment of damages, not the amount that 
could be recovered. 207 Neb. at 277, 207 N.W.2d at 687-88. To rebut the obvious in pari 
materia argument that the recovery and apportionment provisions should be interpreted identi-
cally, the majority stressed republican values - the modern humanitarian trend toward recovery 
of nonpecuniary loss, especially where a minor child's death is involved (lest there be no recovery 
available at all). The court also pointed out that its precedents, not the statute, were the only 
crystal-clear sources of positive law in the state limiting recovery to pecuniary loss. 207 Neb. at 
279, 207 N.W.2d at 689. In overruling those precedents, the court could have made a useful 
point suggested by public choice: the legislature had inserted "pecuniary" into the statute in 
1945, and may well have simply been reflecting what the court had said about the statute rather 
than making any policy judgment about the recovery of nonpecuniary loss. Cf. Li v. Yellow Cab 
Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) ("updating" construction of state 
negligence statute to incorporate comparative negligence scheme). In Li, the statutory language 
did not forbid the updating and the legislature that adopted the statute, while apparently assum-
ing that contributory negligence would be the law, seemed to be simply incorporating then-cur-
rent tort approach rather than intending to freeze tort law from future developments. We 
suspect the same was true of DOHSA. 
134. 111 S. Ct. at 326. 
135. See Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 68 (1913). 
136. 111 S. Ct. at 325. 
137. "We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation." 111 S. 
Ct. at 325. 
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would be exceeding its constitutional role were it to adopt a different 
rule - not under the FELA, which was the subject of the 1913 deci-
sion, nor under the Jones Act, which is presumed to have endorsed the 
1913 decision, but under the federal common law created by Moragne, 
which neither the two earlier statutes nor the 1913 decision had fore-
seen. This conclusion was especially ironic because Moragne was 
based on a rejection of the grudging attitude toward wrongful death 
actions encompassed in the 1913 decision itself. 138 
The Miles Court claimed that its decision was controlled by "[t]he 
logic of Higginbotham" and that in Higginbotham "Congress made the 
decision for us."139 As we have seen, even with repect to Higginbot-
ham this is a questionable assertion. It turns out, however, that Con-
gress had never enacted any statutory language bearing in any way on 
the issue in Miles. The only actual decision was made by the Court 
itself in 1913; everything else is presumed from congressional silence. 
Deference to a legislative decision is all very well and good, but it is 
quite another thing to posit a fictional legislative decision first and 
then "deferentially" extend that fictional decision into a common law 
domain. In the end, the Miles Court's exercise in deference was little 
more than an excuse to avoid responsibility for its own decision. 
This is not to say that courts should always be in the forefront of 
law reform. When a court is asked to make a policy judgment, either 
at the microlevel as in Milwaukee II or at the law-reform level as in 
Moragne, there may be good reason to decline. The court may simply 
be too uncertain of the right answer to intervene, preferring to leave 
the issue to bodies with greater expertise or popular accountability. 
Sometimes the best solution will exceed a court's remedial powers, for 
example, by requiring a new set of highly integrated rules that do not 
lend themselves to common law evolution, or by requiring the creation 
of an administrative agency. In addition, in some circumstances there 
may be good reason to believe that the legislature approves of the ex-
isting rule. Finally, the group adversely affected by a proposed change 
in rules may be very poorly situated to obtain legislative relief, and the 
138. The Vreeland Court went out of its way to recall the common law's hostility to wrong-
ful death actions: 
Nothing is better settled than that at common law the right of action for an injury to the 
person is extinguished by the death of the party injured .... 
At common law loss and damage may, in some cases, accrue to persons dependent upon 
one wrongfully injured and a right of action in some cases arises in their behalf. But this 
cause of action, except for toss of personal services, before the death, abates at the death. 
In Baker v. Bolton, 1 Campbell, 493, Lord Ellenborough ruled that "in a civil court, the 
death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury." 
227 U.S. at 67-68. 
139. 111 S. Ct. at 325. 
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court may be reluctant to foreclose legislative consideration of the 
issue. 
Thus, our endorsement of Moragne and condemnation of Milwau-
kee II and Miles should not be read as support for wide-open common 
law activism. And indeed, it would be highly peculiar to consider Jus-
tice Harlan, author of our paradigm opinion, as a judicial activist. We 
view the legislature as the senior partner in the joint venture of making 
public policy. But the courts can do a great deal to further the enter-
prise, and republicanism and public choice are useful tools in defining 
the border between judicial and legislative prerogatives.140 
CONCLUSION 
In the first place, we have tried in this article to debunk the formal 
categorization of legal problems. In our view, the essential lesson of 
the "New Public Law" - that political theory (and in particular, 
postpluralist theory) matters - is applicable as well to the old private 
law. Although perhaps that point seems obvious, neither "public" law 
nor "private" law scholars have generally recognized that the age of 
statutes has modified legal theory across the board. The shadow of the 
legislature touches the scholar whether or not she is concerned pri-
marily with facilitative or supervening legal rules, statutes or common 
law. 
More particularly, we have attempted to demonstrate that two im-
portant political theories of the New Public Law, republicanism and 
public choice, provide fruitful insights into common law problems. 
Upon reflection, at least some of this may seem obvious as well. The 
common law has probably always involved judicial judgments about 
the ways adjudication can foster the public interest. Republicanism's 
focus on civic virtue adds something distinctive to this process, how-
ever. For example, by emphasizing the legislature's capacity to define 
public values, it strongly reinforces the borrowing of statutory analo-
gies for common law purposes, as Moragne illustrates. In many in-
stances, the legislature is both more legitimate in theory and more 
capable in practice of defining public values than are judges. Yet the 
institutional insulation of judges and the deliberative qualities stressed 
by republicanism - judicial advantages usually considered only in the 
140. Our view - that courts should not unthinkingly refer resolution of an issue to the 
legislature - can also be supported on more traditional grounds. See H. HART & A. SACKS, 
supra note 6, at 543-46. Hart and Sacks, however, are usually seen as somewhat resistant to the 
concept of the courts as making policy. See id. at 397-98. For a more extensive discussion of 
Hart and Sacks, and their relation to the New Public Law, see the article by Eskridge and Peller 
in this Symposium. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a 
Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991). 
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public law setting - will sometimes empower the common law judge 
as well to promote legal change in the pursuit of public values. Public 
choice helps these judges consider the institutional issues that arise in 
an ever-increasingly interactive world of public policymaking. 
It is important, however, not to lose sight of the deeper tension 
between republicanism and public choice. Ultimately they embody 
different perspectives on the nature of politics - as one seeks to re-
mind us of its aspirations, the other recalls its flaws and thereby calls 
those aspirations into question. We doubt if those tensions can ever be 
fully resolved by incorporating both into some even more abstract 
Grand Unified Theory of politics. Rather, this tension may well re-
flect the ultimate moral ambiguity of politics itself. If the phrase were 
not already taken, 141 we might speak here of the "fundamental contra-
diction" of the New Public Law. Such contradictions, we suspect, are 
an essential source of dynamic tension for law as a living practice, as 
opposed to law as abstract theory. In any event, no grand synthesis of 
these two theories is yet available, and legal analysis must proceed in 
the meantime. 
In earlier writings, we have suggested that paradigm cases can 
often offer more guidance than grand theories. 142 Justice Harlan's 
opinion in Moragne, with its sensitivity both to public values and to 
the limitations of judicial policymaking, would serve well as such a 
paradigm for common law judges. 
If nothing else, we hope to encourage legal scholars of all stripes to 
take the new normative and empirical theories seriously. By empha-
sizing the roles these theories can play on a case-by-case basis, we also 
hope to stimulate their consideration by the practitioners of nonstatu-
tory law reform, judges and litigators. For at bottom, republicanism 
and public choice are less useful as recipes for new formal theories of 
public law than as tools for the eclectic process of arguing and decid-
ing hard cases generally. As mainstream public law theory becomes 
increasingly antiformalist, 143 it should be unsurprising that the tools it 
uses have significant potential for common law adjudication. 
141. Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 213 
(1979). 
142. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 40, at 1629-39. See also Farber, Legal Pragmatism 
and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331, 1334-43 (1988); Frickey, supra note 112, at 1219-
20, 1223-40. 
143. This point is probably made most vividly in the work of several Critical Legal Scholars. 
See Feinman, Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REv. 724 (1988); 
Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs': Reading/Rorty/Radical/y (Book Review), 103 HARV. L. REV. 555 
(1989); Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502 
(1985). 
